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Abstract 
 
University budgets are shifting from the purchase of new classroom instructional technology to 
the security of existing technology. This paper examines security alternatives, the implications, 
and challenges of implementation. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
nstructional technology in the classroom has become a necessity across many university campuses as 
the learning environment has turned into a collaborative and interactive experience assisted by 
technology. According to Quality Education Data, expenditures on classroom technology reached 
approximately $5.8 billion in the 2003-2004 academic year (McIntire 2004). Despite this astronomical number, 
instructional technology budgets have been cut at many institutions, with security budgets taking on an increasingly 
important role (Foster, 2003).  
 
Theft of instructional technology is on the rise (Campus Crime Report Online), and universities are not the 
only target. High schools, businesses, and colleges from Canada to South America are dealing with the problem. 
Universities are, by nature, communal environments, and there is exposure of the equipment to various people who 
come from the surrounding community. 
 
This paper explores security options for protecting instructional technology in the classroom. The 
experiences of The University of Tampa, a small, private university in Florida, are used as a basis for assessing the 
security alternatives and options. Additionally, the challenges of costs, implementation, and cultural acceptance are 
explored.  
 
WHAT IS INSTRUCTIONAL TECHNOLOGY? 
 
 There are many forms of classroom instructional technology, all of which add technology hardware and 
software to the classroom to improve the teaching and learning environment. This equipment could include, but is 
not limited to, instructor computers, internet connectivity (either wireless or hard wired), student computers 
(desktops, laptops, or handheld PDAs), video projection to large screen, sound system capabilities, and VCR/DVD 
players. Other equipment could include digital white boards, document projectors, input tablets, interactive touch 
screens, and webcams.  
 
 All this equipment also needs support, not only from associated software, but also from network 
technologies, audio-visual maintenance of bulbs, screens, and information technology assistance. Faculty and 
students may also require training support. Finally, in order to protect the resources installed in the classroom, 
security measures are required. Finally, these various measures of support may require a complex set of coordinated 
resources from multiple institutional departments. 
 
 
 
 
I 
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A CASE FOR INSTRUCTIONAL TECHNOLOGY SECURITY 
 
 The University of Tampa is a small, private university located in central Florida with about 4,500 students 
and 150 faculty members. Each year, more classrooms are equipped with instructional technology, which usually 
includes a computer hookup to display from a projector to a large screen, as well as a VCR and sound system. 
Individual faculty members are each equipped with laptops that they use in their individual offices and bring to the 
shared classroom space. Some classrooms are equipped with additional technology such as electronic whiteboards or 
document projection systems. As the technology has been added to the campus piece-by-piece, it has also been 
disappearing piece-by-piece. In a recent, single academic year, 55 laptops and 32 projection systems were stolen 
from classrooms and offices. The individual replacement cost of each item did not exceed the insurance deductible, 
so no insurance claims could be filed. However, the total cost of losses exceeded a half million dollars – a budget 
amount the small university found difficult to swallow. In the past, proposals for enhanced instructional technology 
security have been passed over because of the magnitude of the upfront expense, but it became clear that the 
expense of this security would be far less than the losses from the equipment. Additionally, losses were more than 
financial – the loss of data, faculty productivity, and student use of classroom technologies was an intangible loss. 
The University of Tampa faced the challenge of searching for alternative security solutions that would best protect 
their instructional technology. 
 
SOLUTIONS FOR SECURING INSTRUCTIONAL TECHNOLOGY 
 
After a period of over a year, during which time individual administrative units within the university 
struggled independently to temper the pace of the loss, a task force of faculty and senior staff was assembled to 
address the long-term protection of the University‟s instructional technologies. At risk was not only the potential to 
lose further instructional capital but the threat that, eventually, one of the technology resources pilfered would 
contain private or sensitive student information. This potential for a dramatic escalation of losses served to galvanize 
the belief that the University needed to act quickly. Together, the dean of students, chief university architect, chief 
of public security, the head of maintenance, head of support services (which includes the janitorial staff and food 
service employees), deans of the two colleges, head of network services, head of audio video support, and a handful 
of other key staff and selected faculty from related faculty committees developed the series of potential solutions 
outlined in this paper. 
 
Solutions for securing instructional technology can be broken down into three basic areas: harnessing, 
monitoring, and access control. Each of these three potential solutions has its particular costs (which include 
hardware, installation, maintenance, manageability, and support) and benefits.  
 
HARNESSING SOLUTIONS 
 
Harnessing type solutions include the use of securing cable hardware, hardened steel cages employed as in-
class / in-office safes, warbling devices (audio incapacitators and alarms), and should mention of the „in-house‟ use 
of reinforced steel saddles with hardened steel cabling and / or proprietary screws and fastening bolts.  
 
Securing cable hardware. The most famous of the harnessing-type solutions is the Kensington lock which 
attaches a hardened steel cable to a standardized eighth-inch securing slot included by most manufacturers on the 
side of laptops, desktop PCs, LCD projectors, and most other electronic equipment. Kensington locks (and devices 
very similar to them) have been standard issue in the corporate workplace for at least the last ten years.  
 
Outside of the reality that the gauge of cables distributed with the popular Kensington securing system can 
be cut without too much trouble, the fact is that the variety of unique keys for these securing devices is woefully 
inadequate. Further, the locks themselves can be disengaged with a steady hand and an unwound paper-clip or, with 
the aid of a flat-tip screwdriver and a little elbow grease, literally pried from the slot attaching them to the device 
(this is because the built-in security slots typically provided by manufactures are located in simple hardened plastic 
housings). While there are ways to enhance a Kensington-type system with the use of large adhesive steel plates 
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(attached to the secured device) or through the use of heavier cabling (as with the Qualtec securing system) it is 
clear that Kensington-type systems are primarily designed to serve as a deterrent for crimes of opportunity. 
 
As for the costs of this potential solution, Kensington-type systems are relatively inexpensive to acquire, 
typically costing between forty and one hundred dollars a unit. If a fastening point is provided in the device to be 
secured and if the device is located near a large piece of furniture, then installation of a Kensington-type solution 
requires only the hardware included in the standard bundled kit. The use of additional commercial adhesive 
fastening points on the secured hardware may require some downtime for the device. Additionally, if needed, the 
positioning of hardened (and convenient) securing points near where the device is to be located may require the 
installation of commercial adhesive steel plates to the wall, floor, or furniture or even the installation of I-bolts into 
the concrete floor or proximal wall. There is no expected maintenance cost for this type security solution and the 
institutional manageability issues are non-existent as the implementation of the device typically becomes the 
responsibility of the end user of the secured property. 
 
In-class / in-office safes.  A second harnessing solution employs the use of large steel cages, reminiscent of 
the great inquisition, to encapsulate instructional technology – in particular, ceiling mounted computer projectors. 
While caging valuable instructional technology within a steel box which is then fastened to a hardened steel pole 
physically secured to the ceiling seems a fair deterrent against theft for all but the most determined thief, it does 
emote a distinctly negative aesthetic. Further, heavy steel cages have specific architectural requirements for the 
space in which they are located and, more specifically, for the walls and ceilings to which they are to be attached. 
Caging solutions also depend on the use of secure padlocks (and necessary secure key systems) to close them. 
 
While caging solutions are only modestly expensive to acquire and install, they are inexpensive to maintain 
and manage. The cages themselves run from a few hundred dollars to a few thousand and require hardened 
installation from the ceiling or the wall near which they are positioned. Access to the unit encapsulated in the steel 
cage for service (like the replacement of bulbs, tightening of cabling, or adjustment of controls) need not be an issue 
if the cage is chosen carefully to include large and appropriately positioned open “pass-through” spaces for both 
interaction with the device and its projection out of the cage. If the cage is chosen such that access is only required 
for installation and heavy service, then a secured key system (with a finite number of known users) does not 
represent a large manageability cost. There are no unique maintenance or service requirements for caging solutions.  
 
Another harnessing security option is the implementation of in-office/in-classroom safes. These enclosures 
can resemble the caging solutions described for ceiling mounted projectors discussed above but are installed, 
instead, at floor level.   These solutions can include removable shelves and are intended for regular access by 
approved users to secure portable projectors, laptops, licensed software, data, or other materials. These steel 
enclosures are typically bolted to either the floor or proximal wall and secured (closed) using heavy steel locks 
which are controlled via a secure key system (deployed by the institution).  
 
While these floor-level security cages or safes are also only modestly expensive to acquire and install, and 
while they also have non-existent maintenance costs, they do require a secure system of keys for the users who are 
approved for access to the secured space. The varied devices range in cost between a few hundred dollars to a few 
thousand dollars and also require fastening to the floor or wall in a hardened means. Unlike projector cages, in-
office/in-classroom safes require regular access and, as such, will require a system of secure keys. The larger the 
number of potential users who must have access, the larger the potential manageability cost. At the end of the access 
control section of this paper, the in-office/in-classroom safe solution is amended to include a smart-lock which can 
give an audit trail of who opened the space, on what day, and for how long. Without such an intelligent lock, the 
manageability costs for this sort of solution depends on the extent of the list of potential users responsible for the 
secured space and the degree to which a culture of personal accountability has been successfully adopted by the 
institution. 
 
Warbling devices.  Warblers, or “screamers,” are audio incapacitators or general alarms used to disorient 
the would-be thieves with a very loud (>120 decibels) noise while, at the same time, attracting the attention of 
security. Such devices are either based on mercury switches (movement triggered) or are primed to make noise 
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when a cable fastening the device to the surrounding space is severed. Potentially, the combination of earlier 
notification for security and the slowed activity of the thief would result in the arrival of security to forestall the 
complete removal of fastened devices.  
 
Warblers are relatively inexpensive to acquire, typically costing less than a hundred dollars each, and may 
be attached to instructional technology devices using steel plates and professional-grade adhesive. Power for these 
devices typically comes from a battery pack which must be changed according to a regular maintenance schedule. 
An additional cost that must be considered is the inadvertent triggering of these alarms during normal operations. It 
would not be unexpected for a legitimate operator to attempt to manipulate projector controls to fine tune its focus or 
aim. For this reason, the use of mercury switches is not advised unless the device is physically out of reach. Though 
manageability costs are non-existent, and support costs are limited with an audio alarm solution, regular 
maintenance of the power source does require some diversion of resources and a period of open accessibility 
(planned inactivity) for the system of secured devices for such maintenance. 
 
In-house solutions.  There are a few other in-house type harnessing solutions for ceiling mounted projectors 
in particular which focus on the means by which the projector is fastened to a steel saddle, which is then attached to 
a steel pole, which is then attached to the ceiling. The focus of such solutions is to employ either significantly 
thicker hardened steel cables or non-standard (proprietary) screws/bolts (where the heads require a particular tool to 
loosen). Though these solutions represent a great deterrent for crimes of opportunity, they do not serve to protect the 
instructional device against those most determined to acquire these expensive assets. Experience has shown that, 
given a sufficient amount of time, steel cables may be meticulously sawed through and the proprietary security 
screws/bolts have matching loosening devices easily acquired at the local hardware store or via internet. Further, 
even if careful attention is taken to attach the pole to the device in a uniquely confounding fashion, even more 
attention must be paid to how the pole is attached to the ceiling. Stories abound of educational institutions having 
found ceiling mounted projectors taken with their innovatively designed steel saddles and proprietary fastened poles 
still attached to them. 
 
MONITORING SOLUTIONS: 
 
Monitoring solutions include the use of cameras, RF tagging & tracking, and IP monitoring.  
 
Cameras.  The efficient use of cameras to limit the loss of assets in the workplace is certainly a complex 
issue. In this paper the topic will be addressed only briefly and in a fashion that will keep it parallel with the 
presentation of the other security options. Closed circuit camera systems are expensive to acquire, install, maintain, 
and support. Individual cameras require power, regular alignment, storage (of captured footage), archiving (long-
term storage of captured footage), and active monitoring by support personnel who do not already have functional 
responsibilities. To complicate things further, complete coverage (even with limited systems that concentrate on all 
entries and exits) may encounter architectural requirements which increase the cost of their employ and, in some 
environments, and there are aesthetic complications to be considered (especially in professional and/or historical 
environments).  
 
Although there are many strategies as to where to place monitoring assets like cameras, a minimum 
coverage should be applied to pinch-points through which all traffic must funnel to enter/exit the facility. Further, 
there are at least two types of basic strategies when using video surveillance: active monitoring and passive review. 
If active monitoring is not the objective (or need), then the support costs of video surveillance can be substantively 
reduced as the need for constant monitoring is transformed into a need for review upon the occasion of an event 
(passive monitoring). Passive monitoring can be further enhanced when tied to access control technologies 
(described below) and/or the use of RF (radio frequency) tracking devices. 
 
RF tagging and tracking.  Radio frequency tags (RF tags) are extremely small, un-powered, and 
inexpensive. After a valuable asset is tagged (typically with a small self-adhesive sticker) RF monitoring devices 
(installed in walls or doorways) can detect and log the passage of the tag (attached to the asset) when it passes by. 
When you tie a video surveillance unit to an RF monitoring device and set it to activate when a sensitive or valuable 
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asset with a RF tag attached to it a passes by then, potentially, you are able to get a picture (or video) of all persons 
in the proximity of the RF sensor when the instructional technology left the premises (or left the area in which it was 
stored). These RF tags are small and can be hidden within an asset (out of sight). Further, as every RF tag has its 
own unique ID, a networked system of RF monitoring devices could identify when a particular asset was last seen 
within the institution and, upon passive review of the relevant surveillance media, identify those individuals who 
could have been in possession of the asset at the time it passed by the sensor. 
 
Though RF tags are inexpensive, the monitoring devices are not especially so. Further, even if RF 
monitoring stations are installed only at pinch-points and/or all exits to a facility, the numbers of these places can be 
significant (especially in older structures). Monitoring stations require installation, power, and, if passive monitoring 
is employed, must be tied to a video monitoring device to be useful. If the assets tagged are limited to those which 
were assumed to be fixed or if there are time periods during which no tagged assets are assumed to me moved (say 
after midnight and before 5 AM) then one option would be to set an alarm to sound if any instructional technology 
passed by an RF monitoring station without prior notification of the monitoring authority. Active monitoring of 
assets, an extreme possibility for an employer, would require additional support personnel. Manageability 
requirements for RF tracking with anything other than passive monitoring have the potential of becoming a 
significant consideration as permissions for movement must be maintained and coordinated between the relevant, 
responsible parties. 
 
IP monitoring.  It is possible to monitor the presence of instructional technology using the computer 
network to which many of devices attach. Every device attached to an institution‟s computer network has a unique 
network interface device which it uses to communicate with the network. Servers attached to the network can be 
tasked with pinging (or electronically shaking hands with) each piece of instructional technology attached to it every 
few seconds. This process is called IP monitoring (every device on the network has a unique internet address, a so-
called IP). When a device unexpectedly leaves the network, for whatever reason, it can signal an alarm which then 
can notify security personnel that there is a problem.  
 
IP monitoring can work well for pieces of instructional technology that are both permanently attached and 
powered on, but will not function for devices that are either completely powered down at some point or for assets 
that physically leave the network at night (like laptop computers) without the use of special auxillary hardware 
monitors (described below).
1
 Still, if the policy within the institution is to report the temporary powering down of a 
device like a projector or the physical removal of a personal computer from the network to the monitoring authority 
before such an event, for whatever reason (perhaps to replace a bulb on a projector or relocate a PC), then ordinary 
IP monitoring can function well within standard educational institutions.  
 
Though most modern IT devices already posses network interface devices within them, some are not 
“always on.” Instructional technology devices that fall into this category would require the addition of an auxiliary 
monitoring device to attach to it which has within it a network interface device that is “always on.” Installation of 
such IP signally devices is typically not especially costly but the devices themselves (which can often monitor 
multiple, proximal, physical devices) can cost a few hundred dollars each.  
 
IP monitoring requires a server to monitor the presence of the instructional technology and any IP reporting 
devices found within the network. These duties may be fulfilled by current server assets but represents an additional 
potential costs for some institutions. Further, while most modern PCs and networked peripherals would not require 
additional hardware assets to be monitored on the network, devices that are completely powered down at night or 
which do not possess a network interface device may require the acquisition of the auxiliary IP monitoring devices 
describe above. Though typical maintenance expectations are limited, expected support and manageability 
responsibilities are potentially extensive. Instructional technology, when limited to computer projectors, can be 
expected to remain in one place most of the time (except when the projector is under maintenance). Instructional 
technology when expanded to include PCs, laptops, and other peripherals (especially if the use of mobile units is 
                                                 
1 When the power on a modern personal computer is shut off, while it remains plugged into the wall, a limited amount of power is typically 
channeled through the network interface device within the computer. So, on such devices the powering down of the PC will not hinder a server on 
the network from pinging it. This is not the case with most computer projectors (or other potentially valuable instructional peripherals).  
Journal of College Teaching & Learning – March 2005                                                            Volume 2, Number 3 
 62 
employed) should be expected to move about on a regular basis. If the second, broader, definition of monitored 
instructional technology is employed, then the coordination of the varied assets on the network increases costs and 
can require additional staffing resources. 
 
ACCESS CONTROL 
 
Access control solutions, broadly defined, include the use of steel keys, punch-key & key-pad locks, smart 
keys, and traditional card access. These solutions may be further divided into access control solutions with audit trail 
capabilities and those without. Additionally, within these two broad categories there is a distinction between those 
without the capacity to be monitored, those that allow for active monitoring and those that allow only for passive 
review. 
 
An audit trail is a formal record of every user who gained access to a particular controlled space at a 
particular time. Though there are administrative procedures that can be followed to track who had access to 
particular traditional steel keys at particular times and/or who may have been originally issued a numeric key-code, 
steel keys and punch locks/pads do not have the capacity to record who entered what space and at what time, and so, 
are not considered access control technologies in the formal sense.
2
 Regardless, a discussion of the use of steel keys 
and punch keys/locks would be prudent in this analysis as they are in wide application today.  
 
Active monitoring systems are those which allow real-time information to be reported to a central location 
regarding who has entered what space and when, whether or not a particular door is open or not, and the current 
level of the power unit employed within the access control system at that location. The defining difference between 
stand-alone devices (those that do not allow for active monitoring) and systems that allow for active-monitoring 
centers around whether or not the device is connected to a central server over a network. Some smart-key and card-
access systems can be networked and, so, allow for active monitoring. Networked access control systems are also 
called hard-wired. 
 
One last defining characteristic among access control systems relates to whether or not the power for the 
system (assuming it is not purely mechanical like steel keys and punch locks) is provided via a battery pack or via a 
wired power connection. Access control systems that are physically connected to a central power source are also 
called hard-powered. 
 
Steel keys.  „Steel keys’ refers to any system of traditional locks which are manually powered and which 
use blank key-stock that may or may not be proprietary to a particular maker. Some steel key solutions employ non-
traditional blanks that are proprietary to a particular firm – they may even employ patented key blanks. The result is 
a key that is very difficult to copy – though blanks for even the most proprietary systems have a way of finding their 
way to markets for those who are interested enough to search for them. From an access control standpoint, keys for a 
particular lock can be assigned to a finite list of persons. Thus, determining who entered what space is simply a 
matter of looking up who had a key issued to them for that time. Although sub-master and super-master keys are 
often employed for steel key systems, their numbers are typically limited.  
 
Steel key locks typically range in cost from forty to one hundred dollars per door, before installation, and 
require limited maintenance for their prolonged use. Steel key solutions can be found for most any door medium 
whether glass, solid wood, or hollow door. Further, steel key locks are weather resistant and operate in all lighting 
environments (something not universal among access control devices). Manageability and support costs for steel key 
systems escalate with the number of doors and according to the complexity of the institutional structure. A secure 
system of keys requires a clear system of rules, an ingrained culture of individual responsibility, and a level of 
staffing which allows for the collection and destruction of old steel keys and/or the identification of devices that 
must be replaced (or re-keyed) due to the misallocation of a key or master-key. 
 
                                                 
2 While some electronic punch code locks can maintain an audit trail of which codes were used to open which locks at which times, codes are 
easily duplicated; therefore there is no way to be sure who actually punched the number into the lock. 
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Punch-key and key-pad locks.  Punch-key and key-pad devices are combination entry devices. Some of 
these devices, when electronic (key-pad), may have limited audit trail capacity recording which code entered the 
lock at what time and on which day. Mechanical (punch-key) devices do not have this capacity. These devices are 
very similar (in function) to the steel key locks which they replace with one exception – the blanks for the lock are 
costless and the ease of the user to duplicate the combination-code key is limited only by the institutional rules (and 
penalties that apply) for its duplication. Unlike the steel key devices that they replace, most of these access control 
devices are somewhat large (with the electronic variant either requiring space for a battery pack or for the 
installation of a direct connection to live current). This sort of access control device is well suited for perimeter 
control needs where many different users are to be given general access and where there is no real need exists to 
track which individuals had access to a particular space at a specific time. 
 
Punch-key and key-pad devices can vary in price from a few hundred dollars for mechanical punch-key 
locks to three or four-hundred dollars for stand-alone, non-hard-powered punchlock systems. Installation is similar 
to that of steel-key solutions with the exception of the hard-wired and / or hard-powered punch-key solutions. 
Punch-key solutions are mechanical and, so , require maintenance in the form of annual grease treatments – a 
requirement which can necessitate additional support personnel (depending on the size of the access control system). 
From a manageability perspective, the cost of administering a punch-key / key-pad solution increases at a greater 
than linear rate with the number of users and according to the complexity of the organization (similar, in effect, to 
that of steel key solutions). 
 
There are a few hybrid steel-key and punch-key / key-pad lock systems that require the use of a punch-code 
to release access to a steel key lock which is then ultimately used to open the lock. Such systems are more 
accountable than punch-key/lock solutions (as the duplication of steel keys is never costless – especially when 
proprietary key blanks are employed). 
 
Smart-keys.  A smart-key is a mechanical key with a computer imbedded within it which communicates 
with a smart-lock containing a data-base of allowable smart-keys for that lock. Each key has a unique ID which 
cannot be altered or duplicated. Smart-key solutions (like Intelli-key) allow an administrator to turn a particular lock 
“on” for a particular key, a series of locks “on” for a particular key, turn “on” a particular key for a set of specific  
locks for particular times, to set a key to expire (negating the need to retrieve keys from departed personnel or even 
adjuncts that only work every few terms), turn a particular lock “off” for a particular key, turn a set of locks “off” 
for a particular key, or even set a lock to open/close automatically at particular times on particular days during the 
term (so called „time-zones.”  The use of time-zones eliminates the need to issue any keys for those scheduled to use 
a controlled space at times the door is scheduled to be open, which makes access by adjunct faculty, graduate 
students, staff, and undergraduates much easier. Further, smart-key solutions log the entry and attempted use of all 
keys in each device on the system. One potential drawback of many of the smart-key technologies is that many of 
them (including Intelli-key) use IR (infra-red) transmissions to communicate between the key and the lock, and so, 
implementation where there are periods of intense and direct sunlight can, on occasion, play havoc with the 
technology. This hybrid mechanical – electronic lock system is also not sealed to the elements (as the key has to be 
physically inserted into the lock) – increasing the cost of maintaining such locks in particularly damp or humid 
environments. Real-time monitoring is possible for hard-wired smart-key solutions, but most are built to be stand-
alone devices.  
 
Smart-key solutions range in cost from three hundred and fifty to six hundred and fifty dollars per lock. 
Installation costs are similar to those of punch-key/key-pad solutions in that they require a bit more space for their 
battery packs and computer parts. Hard-wiring and/or hard-powering smart-key solutions can similarly increase 
installation costs to almost fifteen hundred dollars a unit. From a maintenance cost perspective there are two 
additional costs to the use of these hybrid electric/mechanical devices: necessary annual lubrication and a 
maintenance schedule (typically annual, but less frequent for doors without significant traffic) for the replacement of 
batteries within the stand-alone systems. Smart-keys themselves cost approximately twenty dollars each, which is 
more expensive than regular steel blanks. Manageability of a smart-key solution can be done at a micro 
(administrative unit) level or at a centralized level of bureaucracy. While centralized control of a keying system has 
its cost advantages, the information available for controllers at a more local level allows for administrators to easily 
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turn locks on and off for employees who leave, whose needs change, or whose particular needs are complicated and 
/ or intermittent. Centralized control would require additional support resources (in the form of additional personnel) 
while the use of limited, local zones of control requires only modest human resource commitments.  
 
Smart-cards.  Smart-card solutions employ a card with either a microchip or RF chip imbedded within it. 
One advantage to this potential solution is that many educational institutions already employ a smart card 
technology distributed to all students and employees in the form of their ID card (typically used for food plans, 
sporting event tickets, library services, medical services, etc.). If so, the purchase and distribution of new keys is not 
necessary. Smart-card solutions should not be confused with other traditional card-access systems that use a 
magnetic strip along the backside of the card that may either wear with mechanical use, deteriorate with exposure to 
the sun, or be copied through the use of easily acquired magnetic stripe encoders in the marketplace. As many smart 
card solutions use RF tokens as well as smart chips, they often function as proximity readers (meaning you have to 
wave the card near the lock instead of having to insert it into or pass it through the lock). As such, there are very few 
parts in the reading part of the device that are mechanical (unlike with smart-keys). Non-RF readers use a slot 
reading system, similar to those used with traditional magnetic stripe readers, and are also not as subject to 
mechanical wear as with smart-key mechanical systems. As far as functionality goes, the smart-card access control 
devices function identically to that of the smart-key technologies. 
 
Smart-card solutions range in cost from six hundred and fifty dollars to eight hundred and fifty dollars 
each. Hard-wired and hard-powered solutions can increase the hardware and installation totals to nearly fifteen 
hundred dollars per door. Active monitoring, in hard-wired, hard-powered systems, is possible. Installation and 
manageability costs are identical to those with smart-key solutions. However, as there are not as many moving 
(mechanical) parts to the lock the maintenance and related support needs (for the maintenance needs) are reduced.  
 
HYBRID SYSTEMS AND THE ABUNDANCE OF INFORMATION 
 
One strategy for securing a learning environment, and the instructional technology that exists within it, is to 
provide one of the potential solutions described above especially well. A second, significantly more powerful 
solution, though, integrates solutions of the list from above together into a system best suited for the institutional 
environment in which it exists. Consider the theft of a piece of instructional technology from a secured facility 
employing a system of access control and video surveillance. It is one thing to have a record of an individual‟s 
unique ID opening a secured door (behind which the stolen instruction technology was located). It is something else 
entirely different to have video of the individual on the premises around the same time (eliminating the possibility 
that someone used his unique university credential without his knowledge or permission). Alternatively, consider the 
use of RF tags tied with video surveillance technology which captures the image of any person transporting any 
tagged device through monitored space (like entry/exit pinch-points). Each of these integrated solutions represent a 
non-linear increase in the power of individual security solutions outlined and categorized above. Another hybrid 
solution employs both a harnessing solution and an access control device in the form of an access-control locker. By 
using either a smart-key or smart-card access control lock with a in-classroom / in-office safe used to store 
instructional technology for shared resources seamlessly integrates the harnessing benefits of an in-class safe with 
the personal responsibility aspects of an access control technology capable of producing an audit trail of those users 
who opened (or attempted to open) the secure instructional technology storage area. The range of integrated 
possibilities is extensive, and while integrating solutions increases all aspects of cost identified in this paper 
(hardware, installation, maintenance, manageability, and support), the abundance of information it creates actually 
serves to limit the threat of theft exponentially. 
 
There are many other potential solutions to securing of instructional technology in university/college 
environment. Notably absent from the discussion above are the following: the use of monitored, professional, alarm 
systems such as Brinks; the use of “call home” software / hardware which is installed / soldered into instructional 
technology equipment and programmed to contact authorities if and when it realizes it has left its “home domain;” 
and the use of centralized secure rooms (access-controlled storage centers for instructional technology). The sections 
above outline the leading topics within the market for the securing of instructional technology within open access 
facilities (as opposed to closed work environments like bank offices, administrative offices for private firms, and 
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government office buildings). The problem of securing information technology within these environments is equally 
as challenging but allows for a different set of optimal solutions.  
 
ORGANIZATIONAL AND CULTURAL IMPLICATIONS OF SECURING INSTRUCTIONAL TECHNOLOGY 
 
Security devices for instructional technology are arguably important, but the procurement and installation 
of such security is fraught with challenges. Of course, the first is budgetary concerns. All the security solutions 
mentioned in the previous section have associated hard and soft costs. Typically, educational institutions have fixed 
budgets set a year or more in advance, so even if new instructional technology equipment was budgeted for, the 
additional costs of securing that technology may not have been part of the budget request. 
 
Another part of the challenge of securing instructional technology is that this new budget item spans many 
areas of responsibility. For example, at the University of Tampa (as mentioned above), multiple departments had to 
be involved in designing solutions simply for securing projection systems in the classrooms. The Audio Visual 
department is responsible for projection systems, so security devices had to be evaluated in terms of their 
compatibility with existing projection systems. The Information Technology department had to be involved when 
network connections and IP addresses were required for hooking up the projectors. The Chief University Architect 
had to assess the structural integrity of the rooms in which the various solutions were being considered. Facilities 
was responsible for hard installation of the security “cages” around the projectors. Campus security, who would be 
notified if a security breach took place, also had to be involved. The Dean of Students had to assess how students 
were impacted by the access restrictions imposed by the new security technology. Faculty committees concerned 
with instructional technology were also involved so they could clearly communicate any changes with instructional 
technology‟s end users. The ultimate question became…whose budget would this security expense come out of? IT? 
AV? Security? Facilities?  
 
There are also legal implications for some security technologies. Studies have found an increase in people 
feeling safe in areas with surveillance, followed by a decrease in actual crime levels (Fry, 2004, p. 6). However, 
several concerns have been raised about this technology. Courts have had to analyze the use of such surveillance in 
two distinct areas. First, courts have looked at the necessity of using such technology to take reasonable measures to 
deter criminal activity on their property. Second, the courts have looked at issues surrounding the invasion of 
privacy from the technology. The use of the technology must follow limits established by the constitution and laws 
along with protocols of ethics and professionalism that prevent “unreasonable intrusion into the privacy rights of 
individuals” (Bickel and Brinkley, 2004, p. 303). Video technology can legally be used only to enhance existing 
security measures, but not replace the use of security guards to save money. Strict standards regarding the location 
of the cameras and the use of the tapes must also be followed (Bickel and Brinkley 2004).  
 
Organizational culture issues are a challenge. Faculty members might not feel it is “their job” to deal with 
security issues. A culture of personal responsibility must be endorsed by upper-level management (e.g. department 
chairs and deans). Classroom technology and security solutions must also be accompanied by faculty development 
(Plotnick 2004). Without knowledge and training, faculty are far less likely to use instructional technology or care 
about securing it. Organizational culture, as it relates to responsible actions regarding the security of instructional 
technology, is an area of research that will be addressed in the future work by the authors of this paper and is an area 
of incredible importance and complexity. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Public and commercial pressures for innovation push organizations to continue to add and employ the latest 
technology. But college and university campuses provide a unique open-access environment in which it is especially 
challenging to secure this highly valuable and, at the same time, highly portable instructional technology. The 
management structures of colleges and universities are typically not designed to keep pace with the rapid changes 
that occur in the high-tech part of the instructional technology sector. For starters, they don't have a direct financial 
incentive to develop both a timely and efficient management of the technology and they lack the flexibility to 
facilitate the timely transfer of internal funding for the optimal level of investment. Security measures are often 
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ignored in the drive to place technology in the classrooms because security issues challenge organizations across 
multiple departments and administrative entities. The adoption of instructional technologies should have security 
implications as part-and-parcel of the budget, installation, and subsequent training. 
 
We currently see how technology is fundamentally changing education, making the classroom more 
student-centered and learning more student-driven. Yet, the challenge for leaders is not only about recognizing the 
benefits technology provides, it is also about leading others to see technology's potential and promise, discovering 
funding for its implementation in typically tight or shrinking budgets, and protecting the technology once it is finally 
acquired (Golden 2004). Ultimately, the challenge is about helping all stakeholders use technology to transform the 
culture of education to enhance student performance 
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